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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NICK FAULKNER and KARYL
FAULKNER, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W. STONE,
and THOMAS K. WELCH,
Defendants and Respondent.

Case No. 900389-CA
Category 14(b)

THOMAS K. WELCH,
Cross-Plaintiff and Respondent.
v.
PAUL W. STONE,
Cross-Defendant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, THOMAS K. WELCH

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2) (j) , Utah
Code Annotated, and the Utah Supreme Court's notice of referral
dated June 28, 1990.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Can the sellers under a real estate contract forfeit the

buyer's interest as liquidated damages for default, and then later
recover

installment

payments

under

the

contract

intermediate assignee/assignor of the buyer's interest?

from

an

II.

Can the sellers under a real estate contract enter into

a new and different contract for the sale of the property with the
last assignee/buyer under the original contractf and then later
recover installment payments due under the new contract from the
intermediate assignee/assignor under the original contract?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case
Plaintiffs Nick and Karyl Faulkner brought the action below
to recover several delinquent monthly installment payments under
an Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract for the sale of apartments.
The Faulkners named Tom C. Thorpe ("Thorpe"), Thomas K. Welch
("Welch"), and Paul W. Stone ("Stone") as defendants in the action.
Thorpe was the buyer under the original Uniform Real Estate
Contract.

Welch was Thorpe's assignee under the original Uniform

Real Estate Contract.
original Uniform
apartments

under

Stone was Welch's assignee under the

Real Estate Contract
the

Amended

Uniform

and the buyer
Real

Estate

subsequently executed by the Faulkners and Stone.

of the
Contract

The Faulkners

contend that as an assignee of the original Uniform Real Estate
Contract, Welch is liable for Stone's apparent failure to pay
monthly installments due under the Amended Uniform Real Estate
Contract subsequently entered between the Faulkners and Stone.
Welch

contends

that

he

is

not

liable

for

any

delinquent

installments that may be due under either the original Uniform Real
Estate Contract or the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract because

2

the Faulkners forfeited the buyer's interest under the original
Uniform Real Estate Contract and subsequently entered into a new
contract (the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract) with Stone and
to which Welch is not a party.

Course of Proceedings
and Disposition Below
Welch moved for summary judgment dismissing the Faulkners1
complaint with respect to him.
motion for summary judgment.
judgment.

The trial court granted Welch's
The Faulkners' appealed from that

The other defendants below are not parties to this

appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following is a statement of the undisputed facts presented
to the trial court.

For the Court's convenience copies of the

affidavits and documents considered by the court below and copies
of the trial court's ruling and summary judgment are included in
the Addendum to this Brief.
In April 1978 the Faulkners sold their eight-plex apartment
complex (the "apartments") to Tom C. Thorpe under a Uniform Real
Estate Contract (the "Uniform Real Estate Contract") dated April
8, 1978.

(R. 2, 5-6, Complaint, «[ 5; R. 210, "Exhibit A".)

In

August 1978 Thorpe assigned the buyer's interest in the Uniform
Real Estate Contract to Thomas K. Welch by written assignment dated
August 24, 1978.

(R. 3, 10, Complaint, 5 6.)

In November 1978

defendant Welch assigned the buyer's interest in the Uniform Real
3

Estate Contract to Paul Stone.
"Exhibit Bff.)

(R. 3, 12, Complaint, 5 7; R. 210,

Thereafter, Stone began making the payments due

under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the Faulkners through
Weber Valley Bank, the escrow agent under the contract.

(R. 2 05,

Stone Affidavit, 5 4.)
Stone1 s November 1981 payment under the* Uniform Real Estate
Contract was late. As a consequence, Stone was sent a letter dated
November 30, 1981 signed by the escrow agent (Weber Valley Bank)
acting on behalf of the Faulkners and countersigned

by Nick

Faulkner, demanding that the default be cured and advising that in
the event the default was not cured, the plaintiffs had elected
remedy "A" under paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
(R. 210, "Exhibit C".)

Under remedy "A" elected by the Faulkners,

in the event the default was not cured, the buyer's interest under
the Uniform Real Estate Contract would be forfeited as liquidated
damages to the Faulkners as sellers. Stone responded to the demand
by curing the November 1981 default.

(R. 2 05-6, Stone Affidavit,

11 6.)
Stone's January 1982 payment was also late.
responded just as they had in November 1981.

The Faulkners
Stone received

another letter from the escrow agent acting on behalf of the
Faulkners, countersigned by Nick Faulkner, and demanding that the
latest default be cured and again advising that in the event the
default was not cured, the Faulkners had elected to forfeit the
buyer's interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract pursuant
to remedy "A" under paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate

4

Contract.

Stone was unable to cure this default.

(R. 2 06, Stone

Affidavit, 5 7; R. 210, "Exhibit D,f.)
In early February 1982, defendant Stone received a second
letter

from

Faulkners.

the escrow agent

sent at the direction

of the

This letter informed Stone that the escrow under the

Uniform Real Estate Contract had been terminated and that the
documents in escrow had been released to the plaintiff.
Stone Affidavit, 5 8; R. 210, "Exhibit E".)

(R. 2 06f

The documents placed

in escrow pursuant to the Uniform Real Estate Contract were
actually delivered to the Faulkners.

(R. 241-2.)

At about that same time in February 1982, the Faulkners sent
letters

to

the

tenants

of

the apartments

advising

them

to

thereafter make their rental payments directly to the Faulkners as
owners.

(R. 207, Stone Affidavit, 5 9.)

All of the February 1982

rental payments were either collected by the Faulkners directly or
paid over to them.
Faulkners.
"Exhibit Fff.)

Stone also turned his rent ledger over to the

(R. 207, Stone Affidavit, 55 10 and 11; R. 210,
Between February 1, 1982 and the end of May 1982,

the Faulkners collected all of the rents from the apartments in a
total sum in excess of $12,000. (R. 207, Stone Affidavit, 5 12 and
R. 210, "Exhibit Gft.)
Sometime after the Faulkners took possession of the property,
Stone began negotiating with them to regain his interest in the
forfeited apartments.

During the negotiations, the Faulkners

repeatedly stated that they owned the apartments and were entitled
to the rents.

(R. 207, Stone Affidavit, 5 12.)

5

The negotiations resulted in a new agreement between Faulkners
and Stone pursuant to which Stone would buy the apartments on the
same terms provided in the original Uniform Real Estate Contract
except as modified by a separate written agreement dated May 28,
1982 and signed by the Faulkners as sellers and Stone as buyer.
The modifications included the imposition of a $7,000 "penalty" to
be added to the original purchase price, plus the addition of
another $3,000 to the purchase price in lieu of immediate payment
of $1,500 in "out of pocket costs" claimed by the Faulkners.

The

agreement was also modified to provide that in the event of Stone's
default for failure to make the payments due, the Faulkners1 sole
remedy

would

apartments.

be

forfeiture

of

the

buyer's

interest

in the

(R. 208, Stone Affidavit, 5 14; R. 210, "Exhibit H".)

A new escrow agreement was also entered into between the
Faulkners and Stone with Weber Valley Bank acting as the escrow
agent.

(R. 208, Stone Affidavit, 5 15; R. 210, "Exhibit I".)

The

Faulkners then notified the tenants of the apartments that Stone
was "now the owner" of the apartments by a letter dated May 27,
1982 signed by plaintiff Nick Faulkner.

(R. 209, Stone Affidavit,

5 16; R. 210, "Exhibit J".)
Welch did not participate in any of the negotiations between
the Faulkners and Stone following the Faulkners1 forfeiture of the
buyer's interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract in January
1982.

Welch was not a party to the Amended Uniform Real Estate

Contract between the Faulkners and Stone and never gave his consent
to any modification of the terms of the original Uniform Real

6

Estate Contract.

(R. 207-8, Stone Affidavit, 5 13; R. 200, Welch

Affidavit, 5 4.)
Several years later Stone apparently failed to make some of
the payments which were due under the Amended Uniform Real Estate
Contract.

(R. 3, Complaint, 5 8.)

The Faulkners then brought the

action that is the subject of this appeal to recover the delinquent
installments under the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract from
Thorpe, Welch and Stone, though only Stone was a party to that
agreement.
The trial court granted Welch's Motion for Summary Judgment
on two independent grounds, either of which alone is sufficient to
support summary judgment in his favor.

The first rests on the

Faulkners1 forfeiture of the buyer's interest in the Uniform Real
Estate Contract in January 1982 in response to a default by Welch's
assignee, Stone.

The second rests on the Faulkners' subsequent

negotiation of and entry into a new agreement (the Amended Uniform
Real Estate Contract) with respect to the sale of the subject
property containing terms materially different than the original
Uniform Real Estate Contract.

(R. 238-240, 248-249.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Faulkners Terminated the Original Uniform Real
Estate contract by Forfeiting the Buyers Interest
The undisputed facts show that the Faulkners forfeited the
buyer's interest under the original Uniform Real Estate Contract
and terminated the contract.

Upon Stone's default under the

original Uniform Real Estate Contract the Faulkners gave the
7

required notice of their election to forfeit the buyer's interest
under the contract. When the default was not cured, the Faulkners
completed the forfeiture by sending a second notice stating that
the escrow under the contract had been terminated as a result of
the failure to cure the default.
the escrowed

The escrow had in fact been

terminated

and

documents were delivered

to the

Faulkners.

All else asidef the forfeiture and termination of the

contract was completed when the Faulkners took possession of the
subject apartments and began collecting rents, representing to
others that they were the owners.

The Faulkners* Entry Into the Amended Contract
With Stone Terminated the Original Contract
After forfeiting the buyer1s interest under the original
Uniform Real Estate Contract, the Faulkners entered into an Amended
Uniform Real Estate Contract with Stone. The Amended Uniform Real
Estate Contract provided for an increase in the contract purchase
price and had other different and substantially more burdensome
terms than the original Uniform Real Estate Contract. The Amended
Uniform Real Estate Contract was entered without Welch's knowledge
or consent and was signed by only the Faulkners and Stone.

The

Faulkners1 negotiation of a new agreement with Stone, on terms
different and more burdensome than the original Uniform Real Estate
Contract, discharged the original Uniform Real Estate Contract and
released Welch from any further liability.

Of course, not being

a party to the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract, Welch is not
bound by it.
8

This Action Does Not Involve
Title To the Subject Property
The Faulkners* complaint seeks only the recovery of delinquent
installments under the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract.

It

does not allege a claim to quiet title to the subject apartments.
Welch does not claim any interest in the apartments, and the trial
court's summary judgment affirms that he has no interest in the
apartments.

There Are No Issues To Be
Tried Bv a Jury or Otherwise
The material facts in this case are undisputed.
that Welch is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

They show
There is

no reason to waste the parties' or the Court's time and money on
a jury trial.

By avoiding an unnecessary trial, the summary

judgment procedure has accomplished what it is designed to do.

Sanctions Should Be Imposed
Because This Appeal is Frivolous
There is no legal or factual basis for the Faulkners' appeal.
Accordingly, Welch is entitled to recover its attorneys' fees and
costs on the minimum sanction for the Faulkners having filed a
frivolous appeal.

ARGUMENT
This appeal is an attempt by the Faulkners to evade the
consequences of their choices freely made. The Faulkners chose to
9

forfeit the buyer's interest under the original Uniform Real Estate
Contract and to later negotiate a new and different Amended Uniform
Real Estate Contract with Stone, and Stone alone, for the sale and
purchase of the subject apartments. The Faulkners now try to hold
Welch responsible for Stone's default under the Amended Uniform
Real Estate Contract.

The Faulkners must bear the responsibility

for their own decisions. They cannot, now that they are apparently
unhappy with the result, go back and undo what they have done. Nor
can they shift the consequences of their actions to Welch.

I
The Material Facts Are Undisputed
The Statement of Facts recited above is a statement of the
undisputed facts presented to the trial court. The facts are based
on the allegations of the Faulkners' complaint, the Faulkners*
answers to interrogatories, the affidavits of Stone and Welch and
the relevant documents.

None of these facts were disputed in the

Faulkners' memorandum to the trial court in opposition to Welch's
motion for summary judgment, and accordingly, all are deemed
admitted under Rule 4-501(6), Chapter 4, Judicial Council Rules of
Judicial Administration. Likewise, the Faulkners have not disputed
any of these facts in their brief on this appeal.
There are no other facts in the record, though the Faulkners*
brief in various places makes reference to other alleged facts

10

without any record references.

Any other alleged facts, not being

before the trial court below, cannot be considered by this Court
on appeal. Crook v. Anderson, 115 Ariz. 402, 565 P.2d 908 (1977);
see. Rosander v. Larsen. 14 Utah 2d 1, 376 P.2d 146 (1962).

In

any event, nothing in the Faulkners' brief purports to dispute or
add any fact material to the summary judgment granted by the trial
court.

It is undisputed that the Faulkners forfeited the buyer's

interest under the original Uniform Real Estate Contract and later
negotiated an Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract with Stone.
The Faulkners did submit to the trial court Nick Faulkner's
affidavit in opposition to Welch's motion for summary judgment, but
the affidavit was stricken by the trial court for failure to state
facts, as opposed to conclusions, as required by Rule 56(e), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.2

The Faulkners have neither raised nor

argued the propriety of the trial court's order striking Nick
Faulkner's affidavit. Consequently, the Faulkners have waived the
right to appeal the trial court's order in that respect.
v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. Ill

Berube

P.2d 1033, 1039 at n. 7 (Utah 1989);

Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983).

At various places in the Faulkner's brief they make vague
reference to payments received by Welch from Stone at some time in
the past. The references are made without citation to the record
and, in any event, are not material to the issues raised on this
appeal.
2

A copy of Nick Faulkner's affidavit and Welch's memorandum
supporting the reasons for striking the affidavit are included in
the addendum to the Faulkner's brief.
11

II
The Faulkners1 Forfeiture of the Buyerfs Interest
Precludes Them From Recovering From Welch as an
Assignee/Assignor of the Buyer's Interest
The undisputed facts show that as their remedy for Stone's
breach of the original Uniform Real Estate Contract, the Faulkners
chose to and did forfeit the buyer's interest in the apartments
under the contract.

It is undisputed that when Stone defaulted

under the original Uniform Real Estate Contract, (1) the Faulkners
sent a notice of default in which they selected forfeiture and
liquidated damages as their remedy; (2) when the default was not
cured, the Faulkners terminated the escrow, received the documents
in escrow, and sent notice that the escrow had been terminated;
and (3) then the Faulkners took possession of the apartments,
calling themselves the owners, and began collecting rents.

By

following through on their expressed intention to terminate the
Uniform Real Estate Contract and forfeit the buyer's interest in
the apartments, the Faulkners voluntarily gave up any claim for
damages

they

might

otherwise

have

had

against

Welch

as an

assignee/assignor under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

A.

The Uniform Real Estate contract required the Faulkners
to choose one of the following three alternative remedies
in the event of default:
forfeiture, an action for
delinquent installments, or an action for foreclosure.

The buyer's interest under the original Uniform Real Estate
Contract was assigned from Thorpe to Welch, and then from Welch to
Stone. Sometime after the assignment to Stone, Stone defaulted by

12

failing to make the payment due in January 1982 .3 The failure to
make the January 1982 payment was a default under paragraph 16 of
the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
Stone's default under paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract presented the Faulkners with the option of choosing one
of three "alternative" remedies provided in subparagraphs A, B or
C of that paragraph. The Faulkners could choose (1) to forfeit the
buyer's interest under subparagraph A, or (2) to bring suit for
delinquent installments under subparagraph B, or (3) to declare the
entire unpaid balance due and sue for foreclosure of the contract
as if it were a note and mortgage under subparagraph C. Under the
last option, the Faulkners could seek appointment of a receiver to
take possession and collect rent, but only "upon filing of a
complaint".4 No other remedies are provided for in the Uniform Real
Stone had previously defaulted in November 1981, but this
default was cured.
4

Paragraph 16 provides in full as follows:

16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof
by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make any
payments when the same shall become due, or within fifteen
days thereafter, the Seller, at his option shall have the
following alternative remedies:
A.

Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer
to remedy the default within five days after written
notice, to be released from all obligations in law and
in equity to convey said property, and all payments which
have been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer,
shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages
for the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer
agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and
take possession of said premises without legal processes
as in its first and former estate, together with all
improvements and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and
the said additions and improvements shall remain with the
land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer
13

Estate

Contract.

The

remedies

are

expressly

stated

to

be

"alternative remedies" as opposed to cumulative remedies as is
sometimes provided.

B.

The Faulkners chose to forfeit the buyer's interest as
the remedy for the buyer's default xinder the Uniform Real
Estate contract.

As the remedy for Stone's January 1982 defaultf the Faulkners
chose alternative "A", forfeiture of buyer's interest as liquidated
damages.

Their choice is unequivocally shown by both their words

and deeds.

becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or
B.

The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all
delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions
shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from
resorting to one of the other remedies hereunder in the
event of a subsequent default); or

C.

The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon
written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect
to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed
immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the
laws of the State of Utah, and have the property sold and
the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing,
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may
have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain, the
case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the
filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said
mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of
the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant to
order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of
judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to posse said
premises during the period of redemption.
14

Soon after Stone's default, the Faulkners gave the written
notice of default provided for under alternative "A" and stated
expressly in that notice that they had chosen to proceed by
forfeiture under option "A".

As one would expect given the

Faulkners* choice of forfeiture as their remedy, when Stone's
default was not cured within the time provided, the Faulkners had
the escrow agent send a second notice stating that the escrow under
the Uniform Real Estate Contract had been terminated; the documents
escrowed under the Uniform Real Estate Contract were delivered to
the Faulkners; and the Faulkners took possession of the property
without legal process and began collecting the rents.

(R. 205-7,

Stone Affidavit, 55 6 through 10.)

C.

only forfeiture of the buyer1 s interest under the Uniform
Real Estate Contract would have entitled the Faulkners
to take possession of the apartments as they did.

While

the

Faulkners' conduct

is consistent

with

having

forfeited the buyer's interest under paragraph 16A of the Uniform
Real Estate Contract, it is entirely inconsistent with either of
the other remedies available under paragraphs 16B or 16C. No suit
for delinquent installments under subparagraph B was initiated for
Stone's default. Likewise, no foreclosure suit was filed as would
have been required to foreclose the contract under subparagraph C
§ 78-37-1, Utah Code Annotated.

The only remedy permitting the

Faulkners to take possession of the property and collect the rents
without legal process, as they did, was forfeiture under paragraph
16A.

15

D«

After talcing possession, the Faulkners
themselves as "owners" of the apartments.

referred

to

The Faulkners1 forfeiture of the buyer's interest under the
original Uniform Real Estate Contract for Stone's January 1982
default is confirmed by the Faulkners' own stcLtements. After Stone
failed to cure the January 1982 default within the time allowed,
the Faulkners wrote the tenants of the real property advising them
that the Faulkners were the owners of the property and that the
rents should be paid to them.

(R. 207, Stone Affidavit, 5 9.)

The Faulkners also told Stone that they considered themselves the
owners of the property and entitled to the rents.
Affidavit, 5 12.)

(R. 2 07, Stone

When a new agreement was reached with Stone

regarding his repurchase of the property, the Faulkners executed
a writing informing the tenants that Stone was "now the owner" of
the property.

(R. 209, Stone Affidavit, 5 16; R. 210, "Exhibit

J".)

E.

The Faulkners1 forfeiture of the buyer1s interest under
the original Uniform Real Estate Contract released Welch
from any further liability under the Contract*

By having chosen to forfeit the buyer's interest for Stone's
default, the Faulkners terminated the Uniform Real Estate Contract
and discharged Welch from any future liability under the original
Uniform Real Estate Contract or for any damages for its breach.
This follows both from the language of the contract and the
applicable law.
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The contract provides that upon choosing

the remedy of

forfeiture, "all payments which have been made . . .
contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited

on [the]

to the Seller as

liquidated damages for the non-performance of the contract . . ."
and the property shall become the property of the seller.
contract, thus,

clearly

provides that

forfeiture

results

The
in

termination of the contract and limits the plaintiffs' damages for
the default to the sum of the payments already made.

The cases

adopt a similar rule where the seller has chosen forfeiture as his
remedy.
The rule was aptly stated in two Iowa Supreme Court cases.
In Abodeelv v. Cavras, 221 N.W.2d 494 (Iowa 1974), after having
elected to declare the contract at an end by sending a notice of
forfeiture to the buyer, the seller attempted to sue the buyer for
specific performance and damages for breach of an installment real
estate contract.

The court upheld the trial court's dismissal of

the seller's action, saying at page 498 that:
When the [buyer] defaults in the performance of a
contract for the purchase of real estate the [seller] may
elect which of the foregoing remedies he wishes to
pursue. When he exercises the option given him under the
contract to declare a forfeiture and thus terminate the
contract, the [seller] cannot, in respect to this same
default, thereafter change his position and at the same
time or at another time proceed on a theory based on
affirmance by suing for damages for breach of the
contract or for specific performance since one is
precluded from pursuing inconsistent remedies.
The
remedy of the vendor by way of forfeiture of the contract
and the continued liability of the purchaser for the
purchase money are totally inconsistent and may not both
be pursued.
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In Gray v. Bowers. 332 N.W.2d 323, 325 (Iowa 1983), the basis for
the rule was further clarified:
[W]hen a [seller] exercises a right of forfeiture against
a defaulting [buyer], the liability of the latter for the
unpaid purchase money is extinguished. While it is true
that this result is triggered by the election of a
remedy, i.e., the forfeiture of the contract, the end
result is not dependent on the doctrine of election of
remedies. Such result instead flows from the fact that
the contract between the parties has been terminated,
thereby extinguishing any right to recover the unpaid
purchase price.
Since an assignee's/assignor's

liability

arises from and

depends upon the existence of the contract: originally assigned, a
forfeiture terminates the liability of the assignee/assignor, and
in this case terminates Welch's liability.

Ill
The Faulkners1 Entry Into a New Agreement for the
Sale of the Apartments Containing More Burdensome
Terms Discharges Welch From Any Liability to Faulkners
After the Faulkners took possession of the real property,
Stone began negotiations with them in an effort to regain his
interest in the property.

(R. 207, Stone Affidavit, 5 12.) These

negotiations resulted in an Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract
and new escrow agreement being entered into by the Faulkners and
Stone, without the consent or knowledge of Welch.

(R. 207-8, Stone

Affidavit, 5 13; R. 200, Welch Affidavit, I 4; R. 210, "Exhibits
H and Iff.)

As a result of the Faulkners' and Stone's entry into

the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract, Welch was released from
the original Uniform Real Estate Contract, regardless of whether
the earlier contract had been forfeited.
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(The execution of the

Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract "reinstating" the original
contract with modified terms and the execution of a new escrow
agreement are also consistent with the termination of the original
contract by the earlier forfeiture.

(R. 210f "Exhibits H and

I".)).
Upon the assignment of the buyer's interest in the original
Uniform Real Estate Contract to Stone, Stone as assignee became
primarily liable for the purchase price, and Welch as assignor
became in effect his surety.

Gorman v. Butzel, 272 Mich. 525, 262

N.W. 302 (1935); accord. Boswell v. Lvon. 401 N.E.2d 735, 744 (Ind.
App. 1980) (recognizing the rule, but finding no change in the
assignee's obligation under the circumstances there present). Just
as a surety is released when a material change is made in the
obligations guaranteed without his consent, an assignor of a real
estate contract is released from all liability if the seller and
the last assignee agree to any material change in the terms of the
original contract of sale.

Id.

In addition, the seller's entry

into a new contract with Stone was a novation releasing the
assignor of the original contract from all liability.
In Gorman, supra at 3 04-5, the court stated the rule as
follows:
When a [seller] seeks to enforce the covenant of the
[assignor] to pay the purchase price, he must rely upon
the original contract and be ready, willing, and able to
perform it according to its terms. If the [seller] and
assignee contract with relation to the premises in a
manner inconsistent with the original contract and change
the rights of the [assignor] against the [seller] or
assignee or their obligations to each other or to the
[assignor], it is a novation of parties to the purchase
by means of a novation of contract.
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Moreover, the equitable situation is that the
assignee become primarily liable for the purchase price
and the [assignor] is his surety. [Citation omitted.]
It is familiar law that the obligee and principal cannot
materially change the contract of suretyship without
releasing the surety.
Professor

Corbin

advocated

the

foregoing

rule

when

he

summarized the assignor's liability as follows:
Nor can the assignor escape from his own duty by
assignment of it or by delegating its performance. In
spite of these limitations on his power, however, he may
take comfort in the fact that there are like limitations
upon the power of the obligor and the assignee. He
remains bound by his original duty, as before the
assignment; but the obligor and the assignee cannot
without his consent change the performance that he is
bound to render or the conditions on which he is bound
to render it. This is obviously sound doctrine, although
the question has not often arisen and there is little
case authority.
This may be illustrated by the case of a bilateral
contract for the future sale of goods or land. The buyer
can assign his right to the goods or land and can
delegate performance of his duty to pay the price. He
himself remains bound as before by his duty to pay that
price. But observe that he remains bound "as before";
the assignee and the seller cannot, by agreement or by
waiver, make it the assignor's duty to pay a different
price or on different conditions.
If the seller is
willing to make such a change, he must trust to the
assignee alone.
4 Corbin on Contracts. § 866 at p. 458.
The Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract makes a number of
material changes from the terms in the original Uniform Real Estate
Contract, any one of which is sufficient to release Welch from his
obligations as assignor/surety.

(R. 210, "Exhibit Hlf.)

significant changes are:
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The most

1.

Adding $7,000 to the price that was due under the

original Uniform Real Estate Contract as a penalty charge as a
condition to Stone regaining his ownership interest in the real
property.
2.

(R. 210, "Exhibit H", Paragraph 4.)
The addition of another $3,000 to the price that was due

under the original Uniform Real Estate Contract in lieu of the
payment of $1,500 of costs incurred by the Faulkners as a condition
of Stoned

regaining his interest in the property.

(R. 210,

"Exhibit H", Paragraph 5.)
3.

An

agreement

making

it

a

default

(resulting

in

acceleration of the entire balance due) for Stone or any subsequent
assignor to assign the buyer's interest in the contract without
placing a quit claim deed from the assignee into escrow.

(R. 210,

"Exhibit H", Paragraph 3.)
4.

An agreement limiting plaintiffs' remedy upon default to

forfeiture of the buyer's interest in the subject real property.
(R. 210, "Exhibit H", Paragraph 3.)
The

amended

contract

substantially

changes,

to

Welch's

detriment, the obligations and liabilities of the buyer from those
in the original Uniform Real Estate Contract.

The changes

increased the burden on Stone and increased the likelihood that he
would default.

These material changes, made without Welch's

consent, prejudice Welch and require that he be discharged from
further liability under the original Uniform Real Estate Contract.
(R. 200, Welch Affidavit, 5 4.)

Since Welch is not a party to the
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Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract, he has no obligations under
it.

IV
A Person*s Right to Bring an Action to
Remove a Cloud on Title and Right to Have
Title Issues Determined By a Jury Are
Irrelevant to the Issues Before the Court
The action from which this appeal has been taken is an action
to recover delinquent installments the Faulkners claim are due them
under the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract.

The complaint

seeks neither title to the subject apartments nor adjudication of
any alleged cloud on title to the apartments,,
no interest in the apartments.

Further, Welch has

Welch stands ready to give the

Faulkners, should they request it, a Quit Claim Deed to the
property

to

established —
Summary

confirm

what

the

summary

judgment

has

already

Welch has no interest in the apartments.5
judgment was granted

in this

case to avoid an

unnecessary jury trial. The material facts are not in dispute and
Welch was and is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of
law.

There is not need for a jury trial; the Faulkners have not

been deprived of their day in court or their right to a jury trial.

Under the terms of the original Uniform Real Estate
Contract, upon the Faulkners1 forfeiture of the buyer's interest,
the apartments became Faulkners1 alone.
(R. 210, "Exhibit A",
Paragraph 16A.)
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V
The Faulkners complied With the Forfeiture
Provisions of the Uniform Real Estate Contract,
and Even if They Had Not, Having Taken Possession
of the Property, They Cannot Now Avoid a Forfeiture
Based on Their Own Acts of Noncompliance
In a vain

attempt

to

avoid

the

consequences

of

their

intentional forfeiture of the buyer's interest under the Uniform
Real Estate Contract, the Faulkners seek refuge in the body of law
developed to protect buyers from unreasonable forfeitures.
is not shelter for them there for two reasons.

There

First, the

Faulkners complied with the notice requirements of the Uniform Real
Estate

Contract's

forfeiture

provision.

Second,

the

rules

developed to protect buyers from unreasonable forfeitures cannot
be used to relieve a seller of the consequence of a forfeiture
accepted by the buyer.
In this case, the Faulkners followed the forfeiture procedure
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the letter.

This is not a

situation like those in cases relied upon by the Faulkners in their
brief.

The Faulkners gave the notice of default expressing their

intention to forfeit the buyer's interest as required by the
contract and followed it up with a second notice indicating that
they had forfeited the buyer's interest in accordance with their
previously expressed intention.

The first notice was the notice

of default sent by the escrow agent and countersigned by Nick
Faulkner.

It contained the specific amount to be paid and gave a

reasonable time, as provided in the contract, to cure the default.
The second notice was the notice that the escrow agreement had been
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terminated and the escrowed documents delivered to the Faulkners,
also sent by the escrow agent and countersigned by the Faulkners.
Certainly, after the Faulkners demanded and Stone voluntarily
surrendered possession of the subject apartments, there was no
doubt about the Faulkners having forfeited the buyer's interest or
buyer's understanding regarding the forfeiture.
Even if the Faulkners had not technically complied with the
requirements for forfeiture under the Uniform Real Estate Contract,
they cannot rely on their own failures to evade the consequences
of a forfeiture accepted by the buyer.

It is one thing to permit

an objecting buyer to avoid the loss of his interest in the
property based on the seller's failure to strictly comply with the
requirements of the contract, and quite another to allow the seller
to rely on his own failure to comply with the contract in a belated
attempt to avoid the consequences of having in fact forfeited the
buyer's interest.

There is no reason to permit the seller to

avoid the consequence of his actions based on defenses the buyer
may have had to the seller's forfeiture, particularly when the
seller's exercise of the forfeiture provision has been acquiesced
in by the buyer and possession of the property has been surrendered
to the seller, as here.

Otherwise, the seller could rely on his

own mistakes as a basis for belated rescission of forfeitures
acquiesced in by the buyer, upon deciding that some other remedy
would be more advantageous.

In this case the Faulkners seek to

avoid the consequences of a forfeiture completed in January 1982,
with respect to an action filed in June 1988.
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VI
The Cases Relied Upon By the Faulkners
in the Memorandum Included in the Addendum
to Their Brief Are Inapposite
The Addendum to the Faulkners' brief contains a copy of the
memorandum submitted by them to the trial court below in opposition
to Welch's motion for summary judgment, apparently included as
additional argument in support of their appeal. A response to the
argument in that memorandum isf therefore, appropriate.
In the memorandum submitted below, the Faulkners cited only
one case involving an election to forfeit the buyer's interest
under an installment real estate contract —
Idaho App. 507, 681 P.2d 600 (1984).

Keesee v. Fetzek, 106

They cited it for the

proposition that absent prejudice to the buyer they are entitled
to "change remedies" at any time, thereby avoiding the effects of
their forfeiture of the buyer's interest under the terms of the
Uniform Real Estate Code involved in this case. In so arguing, the
Faulkners ignore the distinction expressly made in the Keesee case
between the result when there has been a mere expression of an
intent to default, which will bind the electing seller only if
relied upon by the buyer to this prejudice, and the actual
forfeiture of the contract by an act in accordance with the express
intention, which without more terminates the contract and forfeits
the buyer's interest.

As the distinction drawn by the court in

the Keesee case shows, a seller cannot act in accordance with his
expressed intention to forfeit without being bound by it.
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By

acting

in accordance with his expressed

executes the forfeiture.

intention the seller

Id. at 605.

In Keesee. the seller sent a notice of default to the buyer
which stated that if the buyer's default was not cured within the
time providedf
contract.

that the seller had elected to terminate the

When the default was not cured, the seller did not

demand possession and did not demand return of the documents held
in escrow under the terms of the real estate contract.

Insteadf

the seller filed suit seeking judgment for the unpaid balance. Id.
at 602. Under these circumstances the court held that the seller
would not be bound to his expressed intention to forfeit, absent
prejudice to the buyer who had remained in possession of the
property.

But, the language in Keesee shows that under the facts

present here, the Keesee court would conclude that the contract had
been forfeited because the Faulkners went beyond a mere expression
of intention to forfeit here, and in fact completed the forfeiture
by their conduct.
In distinguishing, Ellis v. Butterfield. 98 Idaho 644, 570
P.2d 1334 (1977), where the seller was held to have forfeited the
buyer's interest, the Keesee court said at page 605:
Ellis is factually distinguishable from the instant
case in regard to the relationship between the notices
given to the buyers and the sellers' conduct thereafter.
Our research reveals that the Ellis notice stated, in
part:
[The sellers are] giving you thirty days
written notice of intention to terminate our
agreement of Sale for failure to pay
installments due. If all back payments are
not made within thirty days, we will terminate
this contract and have you removed from the
property. [Clerk's Record at 20.]
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That notice, like the notice given in the present casef
referred to a future act by the sellers. In Ellis such
action was taken — escrow papers were withdrawn and
possession was demanded. The forfeiture was complete.
But in the present casef there was no such action by the
sellers. They decided to seek other remedies in court.
The facts in this case are like those in Ellis.

In this case

the Faulkners have also acted on their expressed intention to
forfeit.

Indeed, in this case the Faulkners' acts go beyond those

described as being sufficient in Ellis.

In addition to sending a

notice of default, terminating the escrow and demanding possession,
the

Faulkners

actually

took

possession

of

the

property.

Significantly, the only remedy under the contract pursuant to which
the Faulkners could take possession without suit was by forfeiture.
Moreover,

unlike

the

Keesee

case, here

there

has been

prejudice to buyer's interest as a result of the Faulkners'
conduct.
assignees

As a matter of law, Welch and the other assignors and
of

the

buyer's

interest

were

prejudiced

when

the

Faulkners took possession of the property and began collecting the
rents. Nothing could be more contrary and injurious to the buyer's
ownership interest in the property.
A word also needs to be said about the Faulkners' guotation
from the Jacobsen case cited in the memorandum submitted below as
being at 79 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1969).
that citation or elsewhere

There is no Jacobsen case at

in that volume of the California

Reporter. There is, however, a case containing the language quoted
which is styled Gantner v. Johnson. 79 Cal. Rptr. 381 (App. 1969).
But the quotation apparently taken from the Gantner case is out of
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context in two senses.

First, it is a quotation from the headnote

prepared by the reporting service and not from the text of the case
itself.

Second, it is misleading because the Gantner case did not

involve a situation where the seller had even so much as expressed
an intention to forfeit the buyer1s interest.

Instead, the seller

had from the beginning expressed his intention that the buyers
would

be bound

by

the contract

and

that

considered the contract to be in effect.

the

seller

Id. at 3 85.

always

The sellers

in Gantner were in possession by reason of their having purchased
an interest in the property, not pursuant to any declaration of
forfeiture or termination of the purchase contract.
In the memorandum submitted below, the Faulkners take the
novel position,

without

citing

any authority,

that they can

negotiate a new agreement with a buyer's assignee (Stone in this
case), without releasing the buyer (Welch in this case) from the
old agreement.

The Faulkners assert there was no harm to Welch by

the increase in the purchase price Stone was to pay and the other
changes under the new agreement because they say Welch's obligation
continued

under

the

old

agreement

and

so

was

not

changed.

Plaintiffs misperceive both the effect of the change in the terms
of the agreement and the nature of Welch's obligations as an
assignor.
Welch was prejudiced by the changes made by the amended
contract, whether or not personally obligated, because the changes
made

Stone's

performance

more

burdensome

likelihood that he would default.

28

and

increased

the

Stone was obviously having

difficulty paying the original contract price, let alone a contract
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this brief support this y iew and i ts soundness i s also supported
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damages and single or double costs, including attorney fees, to the

i

prevailing party."

The Faulkners have failed to demonstrate that

there is any basis whatsoever, in fact or in law, for their appeal
of the trial court's judgment•

The appeal is frivolous.

As a

result, both Welch and this Court have been required to expend time
and money, unnecessarily.

The Appellants should, therefore, be

required to pay Welch's costs and the reasonable attorneys' fees
incurred in defending the trial court's judgment on appeal.

CONCLUSION
Welch requests that the trial court's summary judgment be
affirmed and that the Faulkners' appeal be dismissed, and that he
be awarded his costs and a reasonable attorneys' fee.

The

undisputed material facts establish that the only real estate
contract under which Welch ever had any

obligations

to the

Faulkners was terminated by the Faulkners' forfeiture of the
buyer's interest under the contract, and by the Faulkners* entry
into a new and different agreement with Welch's assignee with
respect to the subject apartments.

Welch is not a party to the

Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract under which the Faulkners have
sued to recover delinquent installment payments.

Accordingly,

Welch has no liability to the Faulkners.
Respectfully submitted this r-Z^Tfi
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20 Estate Contract until the complaint in this case was served on
21

me.

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
P,«J0

1
2
3

la ' " I

D A T I li M i l

M i V

I 'I II'I

4

TiM>^laJ4^

5

Thomas K. Welch

6

Subscribed ana sworn L O before me th :i s

7

,• 'S//?

d a y • : • f I 1 a} ,

8
9
10

'NOTARY PUBLIC

11
12

My commission expires:

""idling

13
14
15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

16

This is tn certlfv that the foirpqojnq Affidavit

if Tlmm*

17

K

18

copy thereof, postage prepaid this , '' day of May, 1989, L J the

19

following:

20
21
22
23

' Il I In ii in

PI

I in in l In fjarl les hereto by nidi I in a J l iu

uaie M. D o r i u s , Esq.
P. O. Box U
,!9 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for Plainti ffs
Donald C. H u g h e s , Jr
>20 26th S t r e e t , Suite
i >gden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Defendant Paul -r

24
25
26
27
28

Stone

1

21
3
4
5

61

L. R. Gardiner, Jr. (A-1148)
Thomas R. Vuksinick (A-3341)
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER
50 South Main Street
Eighth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 533-0066

7 Attorneys for Defendant Thomas K. Welch

8

1
91

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

10
11

NICK FAULKNER and KARYL
121 FAULKNER, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
13

)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL W. STONE

C. THORPE, PAUL W.
15 TOM
STONE and THOMAS K. WELCH,

)
)

Civil No. 2698-88

16

)

141 vs.

Defendants.

t#"«*

17
18 THOMAS K. WELCH,

)

Cross-plaintiff,

19

)

20 vs.

211

PAUL W . STONE,

j

Cross-defendant.

22

)

23

24 J

DF UTAH
STATE 1

25

COUNTY

26

OF

,

\lt/\ tk

Paul W. Stone, being

)

i

ss

first

sworn, deposes and

says as

27 follows:
28

9.U

1
21

3

4

1

1.

I am Paul W. Stone, also known as Paul Stone, and am a

defendant and cross-defendant in this action.

5

61
7

81
9

lOJ
111
121

2.

known as Tom Welch, assigned to me his buyer's interest in a
Uniform Real Estate Contract dated April 8, 1978, between Nick
and Karyl Faulkner as sellers and Tom C. Thorpe as buyer.

15

April 8, 1978, between the Faulkners and Thorpe is attached as
Exhibit "A."

18
19

3.

221
23
24
25
26

The real property that is the subject of the Uniform

Real Estate Contract is comprised of two eight plexes located in
Washington Terrace, Utah.
4.

After the buyer's interest in the Uniform Real Estate

Contract was assigned to me I began making payments directly to
the Faulkners as sellers through Weber Valley Bank, the escrow
agent under the contract.

20

211

A true and correct copy of the written assignment

of contract bearing my signature is attached as Exhibit "B."

16
17

A

true and correct copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated

13
14

On or about November 22, 1978, Thomas K. Welch, also

5.

On July 1, 1981.. Arealtech Realty (property management)

owned by Lynn Muirbrook was hired to manage the apartments.
management

agreement

was

terminated

The

on or about February 1,

1982.
6.

My November

1981 payment to the Faulkners was late.

Shortly after November 30, 1981, 1 received a notice of default
bearing that date from the Faulkners through the escrow agent.

27
28

-2-

2'.'5

1

21
3| The notice demanded that the default be cured and stated that in
4 the event the default was not cured, the Faulkners had elected
51 remedy "A" under paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate

6

Contract.

7

8 event

That paragraph provides under remedy "A" that in the

default

1

is not

cured

within

5 days

after

notice,

the

buyer's interest under the contract is forfeited to the seller

9

as

liquidated

101 correct copy
11 Exhibit "C."
121
7.

My

damages. This
of

the

January

default

notice

1982

of

payment

was

cured.

default

was

is

late.

A

true

and

attached

as

Shortly

after

13 January 25, 1982, I received notice of default bearing that date

141
15
16
17
18
19
20

from the Faulkners, again through the escrow agent.
demanded

23

24 J
25
26
27

the default

again elected

be cured

not cured.
1982.

by February

1, 1982, and

the remedy of forfeiture under paragraph 16A of

the Uniform Real Estate Contract

in the event the default was

I was unable to cure the default

A true and correct

by February

1,

copy of that notice of default

is

attached as Exhibit "D."

21

221

that

The notice

8.

In the first part of February 1982 I received a letter

dated February
agent

under

1, 1982, from Weber Valley Bank as the escrow

the

Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract.

That

letter

notified me, among other things, that the escrow had been terminated and the documents held in escrow had been delivered to
the

Faulkners.

A

true

and

attached as Exhibit "E."

28
-3-

correct

copy

of

that

letter

is

1

21

3
4
5

61

9.

On

or

about

February

1,

1982,

the

Faulkners

sent a

letter to the tenants of the real property being purchased under
the Uniform
their

rental

Real

Estate

payments

Contract
to

the

that

advised

Faulkners

as

them

to remit

owners

of

the

7

8 property.

1

9

10.

me and the management

10| property

Hi

The February 1982 rentals that had been collected by

for

me

were

company
paid

that had been managing the real

over

to

the

Faulkners,

and

Nick

Faulkner collected some of the February 1982 rentals himself.

A

121 copy of a list of those rental payments in Nick Faulkner's hand13 writing is attached as Exhibit "F."
14
11. I also turned my rent ledger for the real property
15 over to the Faulkners in February 1982.
16
12. Between February 1, 1982, and May 27, 1982, I entered
17 into negotiations with the Faulkners in an effort to regain my
18
19

201
21

221
23
24
25
26

interest in the forfeited real property.
ations Nick

Faulkner

repeatedly

said that

During those negotithe Faulkners owned

the property and were entitled to the rents.

During this time

the Faulkners collected all of the rents from the real property
in an amount

totaling

over

$12,000.

The

rents collected are

summarized in the document written and signed by Nick Faulkner,
a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit "G."
13.
ticipate

At no time did Thomas K. Welch or Tom C. Thorpe parin my

negotiations

with

the

Faulkners

to

regain my

27
28
-4-

207

1

21
3| interest

4

I51
61
7

of the negotiations.
14.

late

May

1982,

the

Faulkners

to which I would

and

I reached

an

regain my interest in the

real property on the terms set forth in the Uniform Real Estate
except as changed by an agreement dated May 28, 1982.

A true and

101 taining
11

In

agreement pursuant

81 Contract
9

in the real property, nor were they mentioned as part

the

significant

121 $7,000

correct

copy

changes
changes

is

of the May
attached

28, 1982, agreement

as

Exhibit "H."

in the agreement

Among

conthe

was the imposition of a

"penalty" to be added to the principal balance due and an

13

additional $3,000 added to the principal

141

payment

15

required be paid as a condition to regaining my interest in the

16

real property.

17

event of default were also changed.

18
19

201
211
22 j
23
24
25
26
27
28

in lieu of immediate

of $1,500 in "out of pocket costs" that the Faulkners

The terms regarding the Faulkners' remedy in the
Under

the new agreement

between the Faulkners and myself, in the event I was unable to
make the payments when due, the Faulkners' sole remedy was forfeiture
remedy

of

the

under

buyer's

the

new

interest.
purchase

There was
agreement.

to be no other
See

paragraphs

numbered 3, 4 and 5 of the May 28, 1982, agreement, attached as
Exhibit "H."
15.

A new escrow

agreement

was entered

into with Weber

Valley Bank, the Faulkners and me as part of the new purchase
agreement.

A true and correct copy of the escrow agreement is

attached as Exhibit "I."
-5-

1

21

3
4
5
6
7

81
9

16.

14

the Faulkners, I

that I had regained my interest in the property.

To that end,

Nick Faulkner signed and delivered to me a notice to be passed
on to the tenants dated May 27, 1982, a true and correct copy of
which is attached as Exhibit "J." I then began making payments
into the new escrow account as provided in my agreement with the

17.

13

with

also required that they notify the tenants of the real property

101 Faulkners.
11
121

As part of the new agreement

to recover

In June 1988, the Faulkners initiated the suit seeking
the possession of the real property and to collect

payments toward the balance owed under the Uniform Real Estate
Contract.

15

DATED this Z / day of March, 1989.

16
17

' gg^c^-^C^"
^ a u l W. Stone

13

19

Subscribed and sworn to before me this <=>{/

r-fO

day of March,

20..
1989

2111

^^^7~-^)l

ccj<Ajy
tQi&c
NOTARX--38BLIC

23
24 I M v commission expires:

25
26
27
28

-6-

2 A)

1
21

3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

4j

This is to certify that the foregoing Affidavit of Paul W.

5

61

Stone, A/K/A Paul Stone was served upon the parties hereto by

7

mailing a true and correct copy thereof this / S day of Ma*eh,

8 1989,

1

9
10
Hi
12
13

to the following:
Dale M. Dorius, Esq.
P. 0. Box U
29 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Donald C. Hughes, Jr.
520 26th Street, Suite 206
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Defendant Paul W. Stone

14
15
16
17
18
19

201
21

221
23
24
25
26
27
28

-7-

Exhibits

Exhibit A

THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT

IF NOT UNOfcRSIOOO SEU COMPETENT ADVICE

UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
A

1 THIS AGREEMENT. made in duplicate this
8t h
day of
fibril
by and betwaan
N I C K FAULKNER a n d KARYL F A U L K N E R . h i 3 W i f e
I

hereinafter designated as the Seller, and
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of

TQM C .
CQUAtY

THORPE
Qt

W.h.s7i

-

D

-

l9

'" •

_
fiffltff

Of

Utah

2 WITNESSETH That the Seller, for the consideration herein menUoned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer,
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following deacnoed real property, situate in

II

the county of -

Weber

suta of Utah, to-wit. 310 W, 50QQ S o , — O q d e n ,

Utah

Aooasaa
More particularly described as follows.

SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND MADE A PART HEREOF.

3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of T h f f i t ?

Hundred Forty Thousand and no/100

Dollars <i34Q,QQQ.Qft

payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order WfihPT
stric .y within the following times, tn mtFOTty

Valley

Rank,

F.SCmW

FflllT ThflllSaraa U q f r t B U I Y ^ * 1

cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged* and the balance of j

f

'

&

nppf ,

no/lfo44.800.00

t

aUall be paid as follows:

Payments of $2,500.00 or more per month beginning May 10, 1978 at
§2,500.00 or more on or before the 10th day of each and every month
thereafter until April 10, 1988 at which time the entire unpaid principal
and interest shall be due and payable. In addition to the above monthl^i
payments annual principal payments of $5,000.00 shall be due the 10th
day of each and every May beginning May 10, 1379. Weber Valley Bank is1
instructed and authorized to reduce the principal balance by $5,000*00
on May 10, 1979, $5,000.00 on May 10, 1980 and $5,000.00 on May 10, 198|L|
P&LlS&fc £ S S & U & SL &&Jrl,m»9Qn
payments. iQtfc, of
April
lfJJ_
4. Said monthly payment* are to be applied /irst to the payment oi interest *ad mcond to the reduction oi the
principal. Iaterest shall be charged from

ftpf1^-

^

r

T 9 7R

- on all unpaid portions oi the

purchase price at the rate of
per cent ( 9 , 7 5
</f) p a r K n n u m . The Buyer, at his option at anytime,
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage
or contract oy the ttuyei herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or m prepayment of future
installment* at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment m maue.
5 It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts puyment from the Buyer on this contract le»* than according
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller
6. U \* understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property u» favor of S t a f f * fi fWT THgS
a n d L o a n a n d J o e H, B a r t p
with an unpaid balaoca of
I

, as of _

7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said premfees now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said property, except the following
NO e x c e p t i o n s
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to *.»*»«..!

percent

(
%) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments, piovided that the agrregate monthly installment
pa>menu required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property
subje*.. to said loans and mortgages.
U. If the Buyer desiies to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obit'
gallons outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it &hall be the Buyers obligation to assume and
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligation* Prepayment penalties in respect
to obligations against saiu properly incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, »iull be puid by seller unless
said obligations are eusumed or approved by buyer.
10. Ihe Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such
amount as tan be necured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon
the purchase puce above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses neceasary in obtaining »aid loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half provided however, that the monthly pay menu and
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above.
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments o( eveiv kind and nature which are or which may be assessed
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agreea
that there are no eaaessments against said premises except the following.

Weber pasin Water Conservancy District and Central Weber Sewer
Improvement District
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property.

12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes aiter

April

^Q »

1978

13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com*
peny acceptable to the Seller in the amount ot not less than the unpaid balance on this eontreet. or I
—,, . •• ••
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interest* may appear and to deliver th» insurance policy to nlm.
14. In the event the Buyer snail default in the payment of any special or general taxes, usseaaments or insurance
premiums as herein provided, the beller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either
of them, and it Seller elecu ao to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, ail such sums so advanced
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of ^ of. one percent per
month until paid.
16. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or'upon
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition.
16. in the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make
any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within
f j f teen
days thereafter, the
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies:
A. Seller shall have the nght, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice,
to be released from aii obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments wmch have
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller ss liquidated damages for
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improvements and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements snail remain with
the land become the property ot the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for ail delinquent instaiimenU, including coat* and attorneys
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the beller, at his option, from resorting
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of
the State oi Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing,
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may nave a judgment for any deficiency which may remain.
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to
the appointment cf s receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the name pursuant
to order of the court, and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, snail be entitled to the possession
of the said premises during the period of redemption.
17 It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement.
18 In the event there are any hens or encumbrances against said premises other thsn those herein provided for or
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the
same by acts or neglect of the beller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the paymenu herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended
payment* shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid.
19. The SeUer on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued
by or through the acu or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time ot sale or at any time during the
term of this agreement, or at time oi delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer.
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyeir accept* the said property
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto

None

21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreement* contained here*
In, that the defaulting party shall pay aii costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorneys fee, which may arise
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession ot the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit
or otherwise.
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, end assigns of the respective parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year
first above written.

ad/t
^-J^r

<"s

fl*/2*.

Burer
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EXHIBIT MAM

PARCEL I: Part of the Northwest Quarter Ndrthwest Quarter of
SEction 17, Township 5 North, Range 1 Westi, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point North 8St057' West 195 feet
and North 0°22* East 99 feet from the Southeast Corner of
said Northwest Quarter of Northwest Quarter Section, running
thence North 89°57l West 107 feet, thence (North 84 feet
paralleling the West boundary of said Nortjhwest QuarterNorthwest Quarter Section, thence West lQCf feet paralleling
the South boundary of said Northwest Quarter - Northwest
Quarter Section, thence North 0°58l East 9tl feet, thence
East 190 feet paralleling the South boundary of said Northwest
Quarter-Northwest Quarter Section, thence South 0°22* West
80 feet, thence South 89°38l East 17 feet;| thence South 95
feet to the point of beginning.
PARCEL II: A part of the Northwest Quarter* of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 17, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: Beginning at a| point 33 feet
North and 195 feet West of the Southeast Corner of the
Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter^
of Section 17, thence Westerly 107 feet, (paralleling the
South boundary of said Northwest Quarter at Northwest Quarter
of Section 17, thence Northerly 66 feet, paralleling the
East boundary of said Northwest Quarter o£ Northwest Quarter
of Section 17, thence Easterly 107 feet, paralleling the
said South boundary of Northwest Quarter of Northwest Quarter
of Section 17, thence Southerly 66 feet paralleling the said
East boundary of Northwest Quarter of the {Northwest Quarter
of Section 17, to the point of beginning.

EXHIBIT MB"
The above payment includes taxes and insurance which shall
be paid by the Seller and added to the contract balance as paid.
Should the taxes and/or insurance increase the payment herein
shall be increased accordingly. A late penalty of 5% shall be
charged on any payment 10 days or more past due.

Buyer

Buyer

Exhibit B

ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT
THIS AGREEMENT, mod© in the City of O g d e n , State of Utah on the
•Jl£y2L5LfiS.E.

.?.2M

... day of

19.Z.1. by and between

p aii 1* **S tone"

hereinafter referred to as tho assignors, ond
hereinafter referred to os the assignees,

WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, under date of .....Au^US t _ 2 ^ _
~.«.

#

19...2.8

Jj

M&fiffigflSiS?

............. os seiiers, entered into Q

Pom Welch

Contract with

as buyers, of
Z . L # C , , Utah, which contract is delivered herewith, wherein and wnereby the said seiiers
agreed to seii ond the said buyers agreed to purchase, upon the terms, conditions, and provisions therein S4t
forth, aii that certain land, with the building* and improvements thereon, erected, situate, lying and being in
the County of
^.e.ber
„ s l a t # 0 f Utah, and more particularly described as foilowst

SEE ArTACHED

to which agreement in writing, reference is hereby made for all of the forms, conditions and provisions
thereof, and
WHEREAS, the assignees desire to acquire trom trie assignors aii of the right, title and Interest of the
assignors in ond to the said written agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, It is hereby mutually agreed as foilowst
1. That the assignors in consideration of the Payment of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable
consideration, tho receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, assign to the assignee*, aii their right, title ond
interest in and to the aforesaid Uniform Real Estate Contract of
AVi£Vi.§..U...?.Z, 19.2.$.., concerning the
above described property.
2. That to induce the assignees to pay the said sum of money and to accept the said contract, the as*
signors hereby represent to the assignees a% follows*
a. That the assignors have duly performed ail the condition* of the taid contract.
b. That the contract is now in full force and effect and that the unpaid balance of said contract is
$ ^ 2 ^ . ! . i t 7 . f t . - J . 9 with interest paid to the ...J.Q.tJl

day of . . J t a V a a L t e X

, 19.2&..

3. That in consideration of the assignors executing and delivering this agreement, the assignees covenant with the ossignors as foilowst
a. That the assignees will duly keep, observe and perform all of the terms, conditions and provisions
of the said agreement that af to be kept, observed and performed by the assignors.
b. That the assignees will save and hold harmless the assignors of and from any and all actions, suits,
costs, damages, claims ond demands whatsoever arising by reason of an act or omission of the
assignees.
IN WITNESS WHcRcOF, The parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year
first above written.

luViOiO-

EXHIBIT

M

A"

PARCEL I: Part of the Northwest Quarter Northwest Quarter of
SEction 17, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point North a9°57' West 195 feet
and North 0°22' East 99 feet from the Southeast Corner of
said Northwest Quarter of Northwest Quarter Section, running
thence North 89°57' West 107 feet, thence North 84 feet
paralleling the West boundary of said Northwest QuarterNorthwest Quarter Section, thence West 100 feet paralleling
the South boundary of said Northwest Quarter - Northwest
Quarter Section, thence North O ^ 1 East 91 feet, thence
East 190 feet paralleling the South boundary of said Northwest
Quarter-Northwest Quarter Section, thence South 0°22' West
80 feet, thence South 89038' East 17 feet; thence South 95
feet to the point of beginning.
PARCEL II: A part of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 17, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 33 feet
North and 195 feet West of the Southeast Corner of the
Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
of Section 17, thence Westerly 107 feet, paralleling the
South boundary of said Northwest Quarter of Northwest Quarter
of Section 17, thence Northerly 66 'feet, paralleling the
East boundary of said Northwest Quarter of Northwest Quarter
of Section 17, thence Easterly 107 feet, paralleling the
said South boundary of Northwest Quarter of Northwest Quarter
of Section 17, thence Southerly 66 feet paralleling the said
East boundary of Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
of Section 17, to the point of beginning.
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"THIS IS A FORMAL DEMAND, PLACED ON YOUR ESCROW ACCOUNT BY THE
CONTRACT SELLER, YOUR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS IS MANDATORY IF YOU WISH TO RETAIN AN INTEREST IN
THE PROPERTY INVOLVED,"

Dated: Nov. 30,

****

1981

Mr. Stone,

Demand has been placed on this bank by the seller on your Escrow Contract for the
release of the documents held by us, which secure your interest in the property
you have purchased from
Nick Faulkner
This notice has been sent
to you pursuant to the requirements of your Note/Contract, and of Utah State Law.
You are hereby notified that your agreement is in default at this time, for the
following reason(s):
1 X 1 Payment on your Escrow Account #
353
has not yet been received by the
seller or by this office for the month(s) of
Nov, 1981
.
The interest on the account has been paid through
Oct. 1981
This is a default
of paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (or of the contractual obligations of the Note) on file here. The seller has chosen option A 0 f the Uniform
Real Estate Contract (or the remedy outlined in the Note) in order to have this
default in payment satisfied. YOU MUST REMEDY THIS DEFAULT BY REMITTING THE AMOUNT
OF $
2,650.00
This includes the payments currently outstanding, plus late
fees and a demand fee of $
25.00 . (Or, if option C has been chosen, this amount
signifies the entire outstanding balance of the contract plus all fees or unpaid
charges). Unless the above mentioned total is remitted to Weber Valley Bank at
2910 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah so as to be in our possession for processing
no later than 3 o'clock p.m. on Dec. 7, 1981
the documents held
in our files will be turned over to the seller on contract, the Escrow will be
terminated, and legal action will be taken by the seller, which could result in
your complete loss of the property involved.
I I We have not received proof that the property involved in your Escrow Account
* — —
* s properly insured. This is a violation of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract, paragraph 13 ( or the requirements of your Note). You must remedy this
default by supplying this office with a copy of your insurance policy within _ _ _ _
days of the date of this letter. If we have not received proper proof of insurance
by
. the seller will proceed to satisfy this demand by
other means.

•

The seller on your contract is under the opinion that you have allowed the
property to become run-down, violating paragraph 15 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (or the requirements of your Note). You must contact the seller within
days of the date of this notice with specific plans for restoring the property to its
former, proper estate, or the seller will proceed to satisfy this demand by other
means.

^

Signed:
Contract Seller

<

\~~^)

Escrow Officer

YOU MUST REMEDY THIS DEFAULT AS REQUIRED ABOVE BY 3:00 on Dec. 7th 1981
The seller has received a copy of this notice and a copy has been retained in our fil
EXHIBIT

C
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"THIS IS A FORMAL DEMAND, PLACED ON YOUR ESCROW ACCOUNT BY THE
CONTRACT SELLER. YOUR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS IS MANDATORY IF YOU WISH TO RETAIN AN INTEREST IN
THE PROPERTY INVOLVED/1

Dated:
Dear

Jan

25,

1982

Mr. Stone,

Demand has been placed on this bank by the seller on your Escrow Contract for the
release of the documents held by us, vhich secure your interest in the property
you have purchased from
Nick Faulkner
This notice has been sent
to you pursuant to the requirements of your Note/Contract, and of Utah State Lav.
You are hereby notified that your agreement is in default at this time, for the
following reason(s):
lx i Payment on your Escrow Account # 353
has not yet been received by the
seller or by this office for the month(s) of
Jan 1982
.
The interest on the account has been paid through
12-10-82
This is a default
of paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (or of the contractual obligations of the Note) on file here. The seller has chosen option A of the Uniform
Real Estate Contract (or the remedy outlined in the Note) in order to have this
default in payment satisfied. YOU MUST REMEDY THIS DEFAULT BY REMITTING THE AMOUNT
OF $
2,650.00
This includes the payments currently outstanding, plus late
fees and a demand fee of $ 25.00
(Or, if option C has been chosen, this amount
signifies the entire outstanding balance of the contract plus all fees or unpaid
charges). Unless the above mentioned total is remitted to Weber Valley Bank at
2910 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah so as to be in our possession for processing
no later than 3 o'clock p.m. on Feb, 1. 1982
the documents held
in our files will be turned over to the seller on contract, the Escrow will be
terminated, and legal action will be taken by the seller, which could result in
your complete loss of the property involved.
1

1 We have not received proof that the property involved in your Escrow Account
is properly insured. This is a violation of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract, paragraph 13 ( or the requirements of your Note). You must remedy this
default by supplying this office with a copy of your insurance policy within mmmmm_
days of the date of this letter. If we have not received proper proof of insurance
by
. the seller will proceed to satisfy this demand by
other means.

•

The seller on your contract is under the opinion that you have allowed the
property to become run-down, violating paragraph 15 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (or the requirements of your Note). You must contact the seller within _
_
days of the date of this notice with specific plans for restoring the property to its
former, proper estate, or the seller will proceed to satisfy this demand by other
means.

Signed:

Sltc/O
Contract Seller

'-^LAJ^IS

x ^Cu^a.

Q(.

C.?U5te

Escrow Officer

YOU MUST REMEDY THIS DEFAULT AS REQUIRED ABOVE BY 3 o f clock on Feb. 1. 1982
The seller has received a copy of this notice and a copy has been retains 4-

***»
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P 0 Box 9729 * 2910 Washington Boulevard * Ogden, Utah 84401
* Escrow Department * Gary French, Officer *

-hi-, i . n i - j .
Dear

-Di\

^ic^,

This will be your notiiication that Escrow # *^-^ 3. between yourself (yourselves)
and /lA'c-^O -? ^^^iJ^r^j^^
.
has officially been terminated by virtue
ut default on your part after having been notified of obligations required in
your note or contract which you have not fulfilled.
Due to the termination of this contract, we find it necessary to notify you
that no further payments are to be directed to Weber Valley Bank as your Escrow
Agent * Any and all future comminlcation on this matter should be directed to
the contract sellers. We have included their name(a) and address(es) for your
convenience.
Please note that the termination of 4in Escrow Account is NUT an action taken
by the bank, but is an action carried out by us at the specific direction of
the seller(s). Your lack of response to the registered letter mailed to you
earlier concerning this matter is the reason for termination of the escrow.
Had you responded either to this office or directly to the sellers, the termination could have been avoided. Any further communication, as directed above,
needs to be carried out between you and your seller(s). The bank has been indemnified and released from all obligation in the matter.
Please further note that any deeds or conveyances covering your interest in the
property involved have been released to the seller(s). Your ownership of the
property lb thereby in question.
For your own benefit, prompt action on your part directly with your seller(s)
will save you further and unnecessary expenses and problems.

Sincerely,

o

Laura L. Bute
Escrow Dept.

Seller(s):

*X.k r^^

* YOUR WORKING PARTNER BANK * FEDERALLY INSURED BY THE FDIC * CLOSE Tn WIT *
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Exhibit H

Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract
In reference to the Uniform Real Estate Contract between Nick Faulkner and
Karyl Faulkner, the Sellers, and Tom C. Thorpe, who assigned his interest to Tom Welch,
who assigned his interest to Paul W. Stone, the Buyer, dated April 8, 1978 and
covering t.he real property located at 310 W. 5000 S., Washington Terrace, Utah, mora
particularly described in the attached legal description that is made a part of this
document, (see attachment).

The undersigned Seller and Buyer hereby agree to the following
1.

The Uniform Real Estate Contract is.hereby ret
reinstated with the principal
ibalance as of May

2.

10 1982 to be ** 2 9293.139^93^..
3t]j9.93

The next payment is due June 10, 1982 and each 10th of the month thereafter
until April 10, 1988, at which time the ENTIRE unpaid principal and interest
shall be due and payable.

3.

A Quitclaim Deed is hereby place in escrow from Paul W. Stone co Nick
Faulkner and Karyl Faulkner.

If the entire amount is not paid in full on

April 10, 1988, buyers or his assigns will lose any and all equity in the
property when said quitclaim deed is recorded.

If Buyer sells or assigns his

interest or any part of his interest in the property to another person, the
entire amount ... i 1 ...• t.u will be due and payable unless a Quitclaim Deed is
placed In Escrow deeding said property from said person to Nick Faulkner and
Karyl Faulkner.

Said deed will be placed la the Escrow at Weber Valley Bank

between Paul W. Stone and Nick Faulkner and Karyl Faulkner.

4.

It Is also understood that a penalty of $7,000 is charged for reinstatement*
This amount has bejan added to the principle balance of the loan and is
included in the $293,139.93 balance shown in paragraph 1.

Buyers will be

allowed to pay $5,000 cash within 3 years or on or before June 10, 1985 and
has the principle amount reduced by $7,000 on the escrow balance.. This $5000

reduction payment is not in lieu of any $5,000 payment due each May 10th.
5.

It la also understood that an additional $3,000 is added to the principle
balance and Is included in the $293,139.93 balance shown in Paragraph 1.
The'$3,000 is in lieu of receiving the $1,500 cash needed to pay "out of
pocket" coats due 5-27-82.

6.

All other terms of the original Uniform Real Estate Contract remain the same.

This amended Agreement, upon its execution by both parties. Is herewith made an integral
part of the aforementioned Uniform Real Estate Contract

Buyer Paul W. Stone

/

Ni^k Faulkner
Nick

Karyl Faulkner

Witness

Exhibit I

ESCROW AGREEMENT WITH WEBER \flUIZY BANK
AT 2910 VPiSHINGTCN BOULEVAFD-OGDEN, UTAH
NiCk Faulkner and
1. She undersigned
^ ^ Faulkner husband and wife
hereinafter called "Grantor" and
Paul ^tnnn
hereinafter called "Grantee" deliver to you the documents on the property described
herein to be held and disposed of by you in accordance with the instructions and upcn the
terms herein set forth, and not otherwise, to all of which the undersigned agree. Said
documents and property are as follows:
DDCuments to Weber Valley Bank:
Warranty Deeds (Fauiicner to Thorpe to Welch to Stone)
Uniform Real Estate Contract (Faulkner to Thorpe)'
Assignment Contract (Thorpe to Welch to Stone)
Property legal description: l A d d ^ & l ! ^ ^
„ust initial)

See Attachment Hereto and Made a Part Hereof.

2. You are hereby authorized and instructed to deliver the above described dccunents and
property to Graniw utoi payment to you, at the above address, for Grantor, of the total
sum of S_2Q^ i nQ Qi £y*
• Principal and interest on the unpaid balance thereof at 9 3/4 %
per'annum from the drfe^of Mav 10. 198?
Payments shall be as follows:
Payments of $2,500.00 or more per month beginning June 10, 1982 and $2,500.00 or more
on or before the 10th day of each and every month thereafter until April 10. 1988
at which time the entire unpaid principal and interest shall be due and payable.
Ir addition to the above payments annual principal payments of $5,000.00 shall U
due the 10th day of each and every May beginning May 10, 1983. The above payment
includes taxes and insurance which shall be paid by the Seller and added to the
contract balance as paid. Should the taxes and/or insurance increase the payment
herein shall be increased accordingly. A late penalty of 5X shall be charged on any
payment 10 days or more past .due.
.^
^ ,,
3. you are further authonzea and instructed to receive any and all payments after the above
dates specified (due dates), excepting partial payments, which the undersigned understand
you will not accept, providing that Grantor accepts such "late payments" under the terms of
the contract which the undersigned have entered into.
4. If, however, at any time prior to payment in full of principal and interest above specified,
Grantor requests in writing for the delivery of said documents specifying in detail as grounas
therefor, either;
a. lhat all or any part of any payment of principal or interest Terrains unpaid and that
the due date for which has passed; or
b. lhat Grantee has failed to perform any specified term or condition other j£an payment
of principal or interest encumbent on him to be performed under that certain^Sntxact made
by and between Grantor and Grantee, dated Mav ifL 1QR7 and delivered herewith for purposes
of indentification.
Then, m such event or events, hereinafter called "defaults", you shall
promptly mail to Grantee through the United States Mail, postage pre-paid and addressed to
Grantee at 2180 W. 5700 S. Rov. Utah 84067
or any other such address as he may have
cirecteo to you in writing prior to such an event, proper demand for the goods or payroent(s)
stated by Grantor to be due and pending. It.is agreed and understood that you, as Escrow Agent,
will not involve yourself in any collection effort or in any other way than to mail demand
as requested by Grantor. You will be under no obligation to certify that the xtemand letter is
received by Grantee, but simply be required to mail it from your office. If it appears by your
records that all payments or obligations stated in said demand are fully paid or ccnplied
with, or if not then if the same be paid or complied with before the expiration of JLhuudays
after said demand is mailed to Grantee, and within the same time Grantee also proves to your
satisfaction that none of the faults specified in the demand existed at the time demand was
made, or if they did that they no longer do, Grantor's denand shall be disregarded and you sha:
continue to hold these documents and to continue to accept payments as if demand had never beer
placed. If not, then you may, at your discretion, deliver the documents to Grantor or withholc
delivery of said documents until such time as your powers, rights and duties hereunder are
settled acceptably to yourselves.
5. it is understood by all parties hereto that you will use a 360 day interest figuring basis
for this account. All payments, regardless of date received* will be figured frcm payment due
date to payment due date for twelve consecutive thirty day months. No other method will be use<

It is further acknowledge^ y the <jarties hereto that you, » Esc: Agent, do not hofl£*
^serves for taxes and/or insurance premiums of any type, and that you will at no tune take
»sponsibility for payment of said taxes and/or insurance premiums, or be' held accountable
DZ any non-payment of sucn.
It is intended by the parties hereto that the Agent's duties be solely administrative, and
egardless of whether or not you have knowledge of any other agreements, you shall not be
ound to any sucn agreements or the knowledge thereof. This document is your entire instruclon, and you shall hold yourself, as agent, solely to the specifics of this document.
These instructions may be altered or amended only by the written agreement of all parties.
ou may resign as Escrow Agent at any time by notifying the parties of such resignation. Such
esignation shall take effect as of the mailing date of the notification to the parties hereto.
ou shall thereupon be released from all responsibilities in relation to this agreement, except
hat of holding these documents until a successor agent can be employed by the parties. A-tine
eriod of 30 days maximum will be allowed for such appointment, after which you may nail or
therwise deliver all documents held directly to the Grantor (s).
The undersigned agree to hold you harmless and indemnify you from all claims and liabilities
,nd fees that may arise by reason of this agreement or its perfornance hereunder, excepting
)nly acts, or failure to act made in bad faith or gross negligence on your part, and warrant
.hat they have the authority to enter into this agreement and direct you to rely thereon. They
urther state that if at any tune you are m receipt of conflicting instructions and/or deem
'ourself insecure as to tne proper Method for discharging your duties hereunder, then upon
notification to the parties of such condition, you will be ccnpletely discharged of any liabi.ity whatever, all responsibility for clarification and disposal being that of the undersigned.
.0. The undersigned have paid you herewith the sum of $ 100as your initial documentation
fee for this account, and herewith authorize you to deduct tram payments received such annual
servicing fee as you may require from tune to tune for the normal servicing of this account.
fou will further be entitled to your normal fee for any assignment of interest to this account
it the tur»e such assignment i.s presented, and you: normal fee for writing and delivering to the
Irantee any demand xraae under paragraph 4. Said fees shall be paid as follows:
Initial fee by Grantor j^ Grantee. Annual fee by XGrantor Grantee. Denand by Grantee.
LI. All funds are
require three (3)
First: to the
Second: remit

to by distributed as follows, after collection. It is understood that you
full working days to disburse payment after receipt from the Grantee:
payment of all fees and expenses encumbent to this account.
a check to First Security Bank #1277E, $1326.00. Balance to Grantor at

2939 W. 1000 H. Layton, Ut MOT1
12. The words "Grantor" and "Grantee" and all language of this document wnere there is more
than cne grantor or grantee snail be construed as plural, and m cases where one or more are
females the masculine shall include the feminine. The word "undersigned" refers to the Grantor
and Grantee only and not to you.
In WITNESS VHERBDF, the parties have executed this agreement this. 26 day of Mav
19 82 , Bt Sunset, Utah

y£^£
\
State nf

f^z2j?jz/.A^.

-f^^LtJ^^
J

GRANTORS

GRANTEES

Utah

County of Davis
1982

before me personally appeared Nick F a t t i e r
.
known to me to be
tne person{s) wnose name(s)
subscribed to tne foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me
that:Hhe3_executed tne same. IN WITNESS WHEKEDF, I have set my hand and affixed my official
set nereunto on the day and year above mentioned.
On this, the 26 day of May

and Karyl Faulkner, Paul M. Stone

Notary Public for_
Residing at.J22 v As
My Commission p*pires

Pec« IS, 1983

The undersigned at Weber Valley Bank in Ogden, Utah hereby/
ments described in tne foregoing agreement as initiated,
nold and dispose of the same in accordance with the/instri
agreement.
Accepted on

WftV 2 8 ^

at

ounty

e £ receipt of the doculf of the bank to
the terms of said

Qgden, Utah
jValiey S^nx-Escrow Department

Exhibit J

May 27, 1982

The two eight plexes located at 310 W. 5000 S. Washington Terrace have
been reinstated to Paul W. Stone who is now the owner, manager of said unit
as of the date of this letter.

All management needs, renting, repairs problems

are to be directed to Paul W. Stone.

U^ '&usflk«ss<J

Dated _ ^ j

Nick Faulkner

rvUTDTT

T
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NICK FAULKNER and KARYL
FAULKNER, his wife,
vs.

Plaintiffs,

1
T

TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W. STONE
and THOMAS K. WELCH,

)
T

Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANT
THOMAS WELCH'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No.

880902698

)

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Thomas
K.

Welch's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

does

not

contain a

statement of fact that plaintiff's contend are disputed.

To

start with argument stating, "Defendant Welch is still liable
under the contract because plaintiff never received title back
to the propery and the contract was reinstated.11; plaintiff's
Memorandum is supported by Affidavit of Nick Faulkner and Karyl
Faulkner.

Defendant Welch moved for an order striking all of

paragraph five (5) of plaintiff's Affidavit except the portion
of the Affidavit where plaintiff's admit they took possession of
the property subject to the Uniform Real Estate Contract on the
basis that it fails to set forth facts that would be admissible
in evidence

and

instead

states

conclusions not supported by facts.

conclusions,

including

legal

RULING
Faulkner v. Thorpe et al
Case No. 880902698
Page 2
Generalized
motion

conclusory

affidavits

in

for summary judgment do not create a genuine

dispute that will preclude summary judgment.
to

opposition

interrogatories

of

defendant

to

a

factual

Also, in response

Welch's

first

set

of

interrogatories, plaintiff stated under oath that they actually
received the documents which were in escrow about the time they
sent the Notice of Default and Forfeiture.

The Affidavit is

inconsistent with the answer to the interrogatory and there is
no explanation for the inconsistency.
(5) of

the

Affidavit

requirement of Rule

is

stricken

Therefore, paragraph five
for

failure

56(e), except plaintiff's

to

meet

the

admission that

they entered into possession of the subject property.
The facts appear that Welch assigned the buyer's interest
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the defendant Stone.
As a result of Stone's default under the Uniform Real Estate
Contract

plaintiff

sent

a

Notice

of

Default

in

which

they

selected forfeiture in liquidated damages as their remedy if the
default

were

plaintiffs
escrow

and

terminated.

not

cured.

terminated
sent

When

the

notice

to

the

escrow,
Stone

default

received
that

was
the

not

cured,

documents

the* escrow

had

in

been

Plaintiffs took possession of the property without

suit and began collecting rents.

At a later date, plaintiffs

entered into a new agreement with Stone.

The only remedy under

RULING
Faulkner v. Thorpe et al
Case No. 880902698
Page 3
the contract under which the plaintiffs could take possession
without suit was by forfeiture.

On plaintiffs negotiating a new

agreement with Welch as assignee, the original

contract was

replaced and Welch was released.
Defendant Welch's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
DATED this '' ~ of July, 1989.
/

j^rtZ/f-F^L. dU J
RONALD O. HYDE, Judge t I

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

r

day of July, 1989 I

sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to counsel
as follows:
Dale M. Dorius
Attorney for Plaintiff
29 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84 3 02
L. R. Gardiner, Jr.
Attorney for Defendant Welch
50 South Main Street Eighth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Donald C. Hughes, Jr.
Attorney for Defendant Stone
520 Twenty Sixth Street Suite 206
Ogden, Utah 84401
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1

2

C3

5: r J

3
4 L. R. Gardiner, Jr. (A-1148)
Thomas R. Vuksinick (A-3341)

5 CHAPMAN AND CUTLER

50 South Main Street

6 Eighth Floor

Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
(801) 533-0066

7 Telephone:

8 Attorneys for Defendant Thomas K. Welch
9

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,

101

STATE OF UTAH

11

JUL 1 8 1989

121 NICK FAULKNER and KARYL
13

FAULKNER, his wife,
Plaintiffs,

14
15

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W.

16 STONE and THOMAS K. WELCH,
17

Civil No. 88090-2698

Defendants.

18
191

THOMAS K. WELCH,
Cross-plaintiff,

201
21
221
23

vs.
PAUL W. STONE,
Cross-defendant.

24|
25

The

261 judgment
27 i
28

motion

of

defendant

Thomas

K.

Welch

for

summary

in his favor and against the defendants and the related

motion of defendant Welch to strike certain portions of the

1
2
3
4 affidavit of Nick Faulkner having been submitted to the Court
5 for consideration pursuant

to Rule

4-501, Chapter

4 of the

6 Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, and the Court
7 having considered the memorandums and affidavits filed by the
8 parties and having rendered its written ruling on these motions
9 dated July 12, 1989, it is hereby
10

ORDERED, ADJUDGED

11 Affidavit

of

Nick

and

DECREED

Faulkner

that

is stricken,

Paragraph
except

5 of

the

the portion

12 thereof where plaintiff Faulkner admits that the plaintiffs took
13 possession of

the property,

and

summary

judgment

is hereby

14 granted in favor of the defendant Thomas K. Welch and against
15 the

plaintiffs

Nick

Faulkner

and

Karyl

Faulkner

and

the

16 plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed with prejudice as against the
17 defendant Thomas K. Welch.
18

DATED this

/f" day of

J uLy , 1989.

19

BY THE COURT:

20
21
^The Honorable RonaJ/d 0. Hyde
District Court Jud^e

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

~2~

24^

